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Abstract
We use strategic alliances as a setting to examine whether the readability of a firm’s partner’s 10K matters. We find that the increase in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the
announcement of an alliance is relatively lower when the firm’s partner in a strategic alliance has
a less readable 10-K report. Additional tests show that the impact of the readability of a partner’s
10-K is much stronger when investors suspect insufficient due diligence before the alliance’s
formation, when the partner is from a different industry, and when the alliance occurs before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Overall, our results show that the readability of a partner’s annual report
matters—it pays to partner with a firm that writes these reports well.
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1. Introduction
Two recent studies show that the readability of 10-Ks affects a firm’s value. Hwang and Kim
(2017) find that firms whose annual disclosures are less readable trade at a discount. Ertugrul et al.
(2017) find that when a firm’s 10-K is less readable, its loans have shorter maturities and banks
demand higher collateral. These studies indicate that besides quantitative information, investors also
incorporate qualitative information (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008) and that investors’ consider
less readable 10-Ks as an indicator of a firm’s attempt to hide bad news (Li, 2008; Lo et al., 2017).
We build on this stream of literature and ask a question quite different from theirs: Does the
readability of a partner’s 10-K matter in a strategic alliance? Our research is motivated by studies
that find that who a firm associates with can affect its value (Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Cohen et al.,
2008; Engelberg et al., 2012; Yael et al., 2007).
Our goal is to use strategic alliances as a setting to investigate whether allying with a partner
that writes less readable reports can be costly to the firm. Strategic alliances are collaborative
partnerships between two firms where both firms pool their resources to achieve a common
objective.
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According to a report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development the number of strategic alliances grew from 830 transactions to 4,529 between 1989
and 1999 (see OECD report, Kang and Sakai, 2001). By 2000, many of the big global firms had over
20% of their assets and 30% of their research expenditures invested in these alliances (Ernst, 2004).
Studies show that over 80% of the Fortune 1000 CEOs believe that almost 26% of their revenue
can be attributed to strategic alliances (Kale et al., 2009).

The following example is illustrative: Federal-Mogul Corporation that is based in Detroit, MI is a leading producer of
automotive parts, such as chassis, ignition rings, and pistons. They supply these products to automakers around the
world. Johnson Controls is a leading producer of automotive batteries from Milwaukee, WI. In 2007, Federal-Mogul
Corporation entered into a strategic partnership with Johnson Controls to add its batteries as part of Federal-Mogul’s
portfolio of offerings to the automakers. By doing so, Johnson Controls increased its market share and Federal-Mogul
provided a more wholesome and integrated set of equipment to automakers.
1
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Strategic alliances are an ideal setting to examine the effect of the readability of a partner’s
10-K for the following reasons. First, unlike mergers and acquisitions where the acquirer conducts a
thorough valuation of the target, the due diligence before an alliance formation is considerably less.
It is not cost effective to conduct a thorough investigation because alliances, in essence, are
contracts and each party is expected to fulfill its obligations (Yin and Shanley, 2008). Nevin (2014)
notes:
In many cases a full and formal due diligence process may be inappropriate in the early days
of alliance……organizations tend to differ quite markedly in the degree of time and
attention they devote to the question of due diligence before they enter an important
strategic alliance relationship. The difference is probably most extreme in the cases of the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, where the due diligence can take many months if
not as long as year, and the high-tech sector in which due diligence sometimes appears to
not have taken place at all (page 115).
Second, investors are quite sensitive to indicators that can affect the likelihood of an
alliances’ success. This is because strategic alliances have a low chance of success, but when
successful they bring considerable wealth to shareholders. Studies show that anywhere from 30 to
70% fail—they do not deliver what they purport to provide (Bamford et al., 2004). Worse still, one
study finds that 50% of the time, firms withdraw before the alliance’s completion (Lunnan and
Haugland, 2008), which results in value destruction for shareholders (Kale et al., 2002). Despite such
higher failure rates, alliances overall create value (Amici et al., 2013; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Chan
et al., 1997; Chiou and White, 2005)—the stock market has a positive reaction to the announcement
of a strategic alliance.
Third, the announcement of strategic alliances, an example of which we present in the online
appendix, are generally pro-forma, and serious investors like to read the 10-Ks. We find a spike in
the interest in 10-Ks once the firms announce an alliance. Figure 1 shows the number of 10-K
downloads from the SEC website. The number of downloads on the day of the announcement is
almost 53% more than three days before.
3

Together, it appears that if the readability of a partner’s 10-K matters, a strategic alliance is a
setting in which we are likely to detect this association. Therefore, we ask: does the readability of a
partner’s 10-K affect the CAR around the announcement of a strategic alliance?
We posit that the CAR around the announcement will be lower when the partner has a less
readable annual report. Once the firm announces its alliance, investors attempt to estimate the
wealth that the alliance might bring to the shareholders of the firm. Investors, in effect, do a net
present value (NPV) calculation —that is, they estimate the incremental net cash that the alliance
might bring and the riskiness of the alliance. Because a less readable document obfuscates this
information (Lehavy et al., 2011; Li, 2008) and lowers investors’ trust in the partner’s character and
10-K (see for e.g., Lev-Ari and Keysar, 2010; Reber et al., 2004; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2007).
Lower trust creates a negative sentiment that increases the discount rate and lowers the estimates of
future cash flows; the effect of both of these factors is to lower the NPV of the alliance.
To empirically test the effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K report on the firm’s CAR
around the alliance’s announcement, we collect data on strategic alliances from the SDC Platinum
database—a database popular for studying strategic alliances. We focus on alliances that involve only
two firms. For each announcement, we obtain the CAR for both partners over a five-day window (2, +2). Each announcement results in two observations. For example, if firms A and B form a
strategic alliance, then for one observation, A is the firm and B is the partner; and for the other, B is
the firm and A is the partner. We add the partner’s fog index that is our metric for the readability of
annual 10-K reports to this data set. The fog index is a popular metric for measuring the readability
of 10-Ks (see e.g., Lee, 2012; Lehavy et al., 2011; Li, 2008; Miller, 2010). These data are available
from Feng Li’s website. Next, we add the firm-level controls for both the firm and the partner in the
alliance. The firm-level data are based on the one year before the announcement of a strategic
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alliance. Then in a multivariate framework, we examine whether the readability of the partner’s 10-K
report from the previous year affects the CAR of the firm.
We find that the CAR around the alliance announcement is lower when the partner has a
less readable 10-K report, which supports our hypothesis. This finding holds for both univariate and
multivariate analyses. For example, when we split the sample into two groups based on the median
fog index, the CAR at the time of the announcement of the alliance is 1.81% for a firm with a
partner that has a more readable 10-K report; and the CAR is only 0.84%—a 50% drop—for a firm
with a partner that has a less readable 10-K report. Further, these differences are also statistically
significant. A multivariate analysis that controls for a variety of firm-level controls for both the firm
and the partner corroborates the univariate results. We continue to find that if the partner has a less
readable 10-K report, the CAR is lower for the firm. The economic significance is also large: a
change in one standard deviation of readability is associated with a 43% lower CAR. This association
is robust to a wide range of control variables, alternative measures of readability, and alternative
windows to measure the firm’s CAR. The results are also robust when we use alternative methods
such as propensity score matching. What is more, the adverse effect of partner’s 10-K readability is
much stronger when the number of downloads for their partner’s 10-Ks are higher.
A key concern, as with any regression analysis, is that the correlation is spurious. We conduct
a number of tests to alleviate this concern. First, we address whether the negative association
between the readability of the partner’s 10-K report and the CAR is because we assume a linear
relation between them. We re-test our hypothesis using propensity score matching, which is a nonparametric method. This method does not assume any sort of relation between the dependent
variable and the covariates. It is also designed to rule out the possibility of a spurious correlation
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Our results continue to hold when we use this method. Second, we
examine if the extent to which the partner’s 10-K was downloaded from the SEC website
5

exacerbates the effect of the partner’s 10-K readability on the cumulative abnormal return for the
firm. We find that it does—the economic impact of the partner’s readability is significantly higher
when the 10-K of the firm’s partner is downloaded more. Third, we use the SEC’s Plain English
Initiative (PEI) of 1998 as a shock that suddenly improved the readability of 10-Ks to conduct a
difference-in-difference analysis. This analysis shows that firms that had among the least readable
10-Ks in 1997 significantly improved their readability in 1999, and partnership with these firms did
not reduce the cumulative abnormal return of a firm in 1999 to the extent it did in 1997.
Further, we conduct a number of tests to check whether they corroborate our argument. If
the results of the additional tests support the explanations we provide on why readability affects the
CAR, then the association between the two variables is unlikely to be spurious (Guiso et al., 2008;
Guiso et al., 2004). For example, if the readability of a partner’s 10-K affects the CAR because it is
an indication of the partner’s credibility, then the readability’s effect on the CAR should be stronger
when an alliance involves greater information asymmetry. The idea is that the credibility or lack
thereof matters more when operating in a relatively opaque environment. We consider three
instances of information asymmetry: when investors suspect insufficient due diligence before
forming an alliance, when the partner is from a different industry, and in the pre-SOX period when
rules concerning financial reporting were relatively lax. The results largely support this idea.
One of our arguments is that an alliance with a partner that has a less readable 10-K is more
likely to abort. We collect data from SDC Platinum on which alliances are withdrawn before their
realization and test if the probability of a withdrawal is greater for alliances that have partners with
less readable 10-K reports. We find the probability of withdrawal is greater when the partner has a
less readable 10-K report.
We also rule out a couple of alternative explanations. One explanation for our results is that
it is not the readability per se that affects the CAR but rather the opacity of the partner’s financial
6

situation. However, this explanation is unlikely because investors focus mainly on estimating the
compatibility of the partner with the firm, not the partner’s degree of earnings management.
Empirical tests support our argument. We find no evidence that the earnings management of the
partner affects the CAR around a strategic alliance’s announcement. Another possibility is that we
are not capturing the effect of the readability of a partner’s annual report but rather the poor
corporate governance of the partner—that is, the board of directors of some partners might have
less control over their CEOs. But that does not appear to be the case either. Our results are robust
when we control for the partner’s and the firm’s corporate governance.
2. Contribution to the literature
We add a new perspective to the literature on the readability of 10-Ks. We show that not
only does the readability of the firm’s 10-K report affects investors’ perceptions (Ertugrul et al.,
2017; Hwang and Kim, 2017), but the readability of a partner’s 10-K also affects investors’
perceptions—investors punish firms for forming alliances with partners who write less readable 10Ks. By doing so, our study contributes to a nascent but burgeoning stream of research that finds
that not only does the quantitative information in the annual reports matter, but the qualitative
information in the reports, such as its readability, also matters (e.g., Bonsall and Miller, 2016;
Ertugrul et al., 2017; Hwang and Kim, 2017; Laksmana et al., 2012; Lawrence, 2013; Lee, 2012; You
and Zhang, 2009).2 What makes our study striking is that prior studies have all focused on the firm’s
10-K readability, to the best of our knowledge no other study demonstrates that the readability of a
partner’s 10-K also affects the other firm’s value.
Our research complements a number of recent studies that find that a firm’s associations can
affect its value. For example, Boone and Ivanov (2012) show that when one of the partners in a
Some research focuses on other aspects of narration such as ambiguity, tone, and abnormalities in the disclosure
(Friberg and Seiler, 2017; Hoberg and Lewis, 2017; Price et al., 2012)
2
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strategic alliance goes bankrupt, the stock price of the non-bankrupt partner drops. Engelberg et al.
(2012) show that when a firm does not have a close interpersonal linkage with banks, it pays a higher
interest rate on its loans. Our study shows that not only can an extreme event such as bankruptcy
and the lack of a close link hurt a firm but that a mundane aspect of a firm such as the 10-K report’s
readability can also be detrimental.
We also contribute to the strategic alliance literature. Because we find that the CAR is lower
when partner’s 10-K is less readable, our study shows that readability might indicate the likelihood
of an alliance’s success. A large body of literature uses the CAR to measure an alliance’s expected
success (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arino and De La Torre, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale
et al., 2001) because it captures the investors’ expectation on how much wealth the alliance will bring
to the firm’s shareholders (Chan et al., 1997). The CAR is also positively correlated with managers’
evaluation of the alliance’s success ex post (Kale et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2002). Kale et al. (2001)
note that in the United States, in “almost 8 out of 10 cases, an alliance that was eventually rated as
‘successful’ by managers had also been received well by the market when it was first
formed/announced (page 464).” Critics might still be skeptical about this conjecture. They might
argue that because the readability affects the investor’s perception it can affect the CAR of a
strategic alliance, but it is unlikely to affect the real success. However, it is possible, as we argue, that
a partner that has less readable annual reports is less trustworthy and that forming an alliance with a
low trust partner has a higher chance of failure. Indeed, one of our tests shows that a direct measure
of success—the probability of an alliance being aborted—is also higher when the partner has a less
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readable report. Given the important role that alliances play in corporate strategy, 3 this is an
economically important contribution.
Our study also has policy and managerial implications. The policy implication of our paper is
that the ongoing effort of the SEC to encourage the use of plain English is a good one. By showing
that the better readability of 10-Ks is associated with a greater chance of a successful strategic
alliance from an investor’s perspective, our study finds an alternative channel by which a readable
10-K report can lead to better allocations of capital. The managerial implication of our paper is that
the firms should be wary of forming an alliance with firms that have less readable 10-Ks—investors
perceive these alliances as having a lower chance of success.
3. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
In Figure 2, we summarize the mechanism by which the poor readability of a partner’s 10-K
might affect the CAR around a firm’s announcement of its strategic alliance. In the rest of this
section, we provide arguments grounded in the literature and empirical evidence to substantiate the
thoughts we summarize in Figure 2.
3.1. Investors will have difficulty understanding the partner’s 10-K when it is less readable
The research shows that even experts have difficulty extracting information from annual
reports written with long sentences and more complex words. For example, Lehavy et al. (2011) find
that when a firm has a less readable 10-K report, an analyst that specializes in the firm’s industry has
difficulty in analyzing its prospects—firms with less readable 10-K reports have a larger number of
analysts following. These analysts also exert greater effort in preparing reports for these firms. And
3

A strategic alliance is an important aspect of corporate strategy as it is a tool for knowledge transfer (Gomes-Casseres
et al., 2006), a vehicle for entering new markets (Robinson, 2008), a mechanism to quickly gain a competitive edge
(Deeds and Hill, 1996), a source of alternative financing (Ozmel et al., 2013), and a tool to lower the cost of debt (Chou
et al., 2014).
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despite this increased effort, the same study finds that the analyst’s estimates have greater dispersion
and lower accuracy. Lundholm et al. (2014) show that even institutional investors who are trained at
going over 10-K reports prefer to invest in foreign firms with clearer reports.
3.2. When 10-K is less readable, investors trust them less, and consider the managers who wrote those reports less
trustworthy
The developments in various streams of the literature indicate that less readable 10-K
reports are associated with poor credibility—that is, investors will trust those documents less and
have less faith in the management that produced the report. The psychology literature argues that
individuals subconsciously treat feelings of fluency as heuristic cues that the information presented
to them can be relied on (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2007). For example, Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010)
conduct an experiment where participants judge trivial statements such as “Ants don’t sleep” and “A
giraffe can go without water longer than a camel can.” Participants judged these statements as less
true when a non-native or native with an accent spoke, compared to a native without accent. Reber
et al. (2004) propose that when the perceiver can process with ease, his or her aesthetic response is
much more positive—they are perceived as more truthful. Summarizing their research, they write:
Multiple theoretical notions converge on the assumption that high fluency is positively
marked. The basic idea in all these notions is that high fluency says something about a
positive state of affairs, either within the cognitive system or in the world…. High fluency
may also feel good because it signals that an external stimulus is familiar, and thus unlikely to
be harmful (page 366).
The neuroscience branch of the psychology literature finds an anatomical basis for why
cognitive processing is associated with a positive response—the processing of information and the
emotional response occur simultaneously in the same parts of the brain (Fernandez-Duque et al.,
2000; Lane et al., 1998; LeDoux, 1998).
The recent literature in business also corroborates the findings of psychology. Alter and
Oppenheimer (2006) find that in the short run, IPOs with easily pronounceable names outperform
10

those with names that are difficult to pronounce. The research in monetary economics also points in
a similar direction. In a study that uses similar metrics of readability as we do, Jansen (2011) finds
that when the prepared testimony of the central bank’s chairperson is more readable, it reduces
volatility in the financial market to a great extent. One reason why readable testimony is effective in
calming the market is that it is viewed as more credible (Blinder et al., 2008; Winkler, 2000).
Rennekamp (2012) shows that investors believe 10-K reports more if the information presented to
them is more readable.
Apart from making what is disclosed less believable, poorly written 10-K reports might also
send a negative signal about the management’s credibility. By credibility, we mean a combined
measure of competence—how much someone can trust their claim of competence. The research
finds that the fluency of the messenger leads to a positive evaluation of the messenger
(Oppenheimer, 2006). In other words, regardless of what the firm reports, investors will perceive the
management as more credible if the report is fluent.
There is also some empirical evidence that uses secondary data that shows that readability is
associated with less trustworthy behavior. Moffitt and Burns (2009) examine fraudulent and nonfraudulent 10-Ks. They find that the 10-Ks of fraudulent firms use more complex words and
qualifying conjunctions that make them difficult to read. On the other hand, the 10-Ks of nonfraudulent firms use less complex words and are easier to read.
3.3. When investors find the partner less trustworthy, they will consider the alliance risky and be pessimistic about the
benefits the alliance will bring
Knowing that many announcements of strategic alliances never even come to realization,
and even those that do rarely provide what managers expect them to, investors will critically evaluate
the likelihood of the alliance’s failure. Investors will also ask questions such as: How reliable is the
strength that the partner boasts about in its 10-K? For example, is their foreign presence as good as
11

they make it out to be? Will the partner be able to deliver what they promise? Will the partner’s
managers act opportunistically? Will they comply with regulators and customers while the firm is in
alliance with the partner?
Because poor readability of a 10-K affects the perception of a partner’s credibility, investors
are likely to be skeptical of what they read about the partner’s self-assessment of its strength.
Investors will also consider these firms to have greater relational risk—the probability that the
manager might act opportunistically; greater operational risk—the probability that a partner might
fail to meet what was promised.
Investors will also associate a partner with a less readable annual report as having greater
compliance risk—the probability that it might fail to meet the customer’s, supplier’s, or the
regulator’s expectations (Das and Teng, 2001) and indirectly affect the firm. These indirect effects
are not trivial. Overall, investors will increase the discount rate in their calculation of the NPV that
they expect the alliance to bring to the firm.
Investors will also be pessimistic about the alliance’s future because they will have difficulty
understanding exactly how the partner will bring benefits to the firm. This pessimism will lead to
investors expecting the alliances to have a shorter life, and lower net cash flow in the future.

3.4. Investors’ higher estimates of risk and pessimism about net cash flow from the alliance will lead to a lower
estimate of NPV from the alliance and therefore a lower CAR
The CAR around an alliance’s announcement is in effect a reflection of investors’ perception
of the NPV the alliance will generate for the firm. Absent a clear picture due to poor readability of
10-K and low credibility, all of the factors that go into the calculation of NPV will be conservative—
the expectation of incremental cash that the alliance will be expected to bring to the firm will be
lower, the expectation of how long the alliance will last will be shorter, and the expectation on the
12

riskiness of the alliance will be greater—all of which will reduce the expected NPV. With a lower
expectation on the NPV of the cash the alliance is expected to generate, holding other factors
constant, investors will be less likely to buy, and more likely to sell. This behavior will reduce the
CAR around the firm’s announcement of an alliance.
Based on these arguments, we make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, the poorer the readability of the partner’s annual 10-K report, the lower the
cumulative abnormal stock return is around the announcement of the strategic alliance.
4.

Empirical Model & Measurement of key variables

4.1. Empirical model
Our purpose is to examine how the readability of the partner’s 10-K reports affects the CAR
around a strategic alliance’s announcement. Therefore, in an alliance with two firms, the dependent
variable is from one firm, and the key research variable is from the other. This reasoning can be best
understood by the following example. If firms A and B form a strategic alliance, then this alliance
leads to two observations. One where the dependent variable is the CAR of A, and the key research
variable, the readability of the partner’s 10-K report, comes from B. And, two, where the dependent
variable is the CAR of B, and the partner’s readability measure comes from A. Given that we
examine whether one firm’s CAR is affected by the readability of another firm’s 10-K report, we
need to control for the characteristics of both firms.
The empirical model we use to test our hypothesis is as follows:
CAR (-2,+2)_firm=
β0 + β1Fog_partner + β2Fog_firm + β3Ln(assets)_firm + β4ROA_firm + β5Debt-to-assets_firm + β6Market-tobook_firm + β7Intangibles_firm + β8R&D_firm + β9R&D Dummy_firm + β10Num_of_bus_seg_firm +
β11Stock_volatility_firm + β12Social_capital_firm + β13 Alliances_exp_firm + β14 Number_of_analyst_firm + β15
Analyst_Est._Dispersion_firm+ β16Ln(Assets)_partner + β17ROA_partner + β18Debt-to-assets_partner +
13

β19Market-to-book_partner + β20Intangibles_partner + β21R&D_partner + β22R&D Dummy_partner +
β23Num_of_bus_seg_partner + β24Stock_volatility_partner + β25Social_capital_partner + β26
Alliances_exp_partner + β27Alliance_exp_together + β28 Number_of_analyst_partner+ β29
Analyst_Est._Dispersion_partner + Alliance type Indicators + Industry indicators + Year indictors + ε.---(1).
Where,
CAR (-2,+2)_firm=

the cumulative abnormal stock market return of the firm for a
window of (-2,+2)

Fog_partner =

the fog index of the partner’s 10-K report as constructed in
(Li, 2008)

Fog_firm =

the fog index of the firm’s 10-K report as constructed in (Li,
2008)

Ln(assets)_firm =

the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm

ROA_firm =

the ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total
assets of the firm

Debt-to-assets_firm =

the ratio of total liabilities to assets of the firm

Market-to-book_firm =

the market-to-book value of the firm

Intangibles_firm =

the ratio of intangibles to total assets of the firm

R&D_firm =

the ratio of R&D to total assets of the firm

R&D dummy_firm =

an indicator variable that equals one if R&D is not reported
by the firm and zero otherwise.

Num_of_bus_seg_firm =

the number of business segments of the firm

Stock_volatility_firm =

the 12-month standard deviation of the stock returns using
monthly return data on the firm from CRSP
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Social_capital_firm =

the social capital of the county where the firm is

headquartered
Alliances_exp_firm =

an indicator variable if the firm has prior experience in
alliance formation

Number_of_analyst_firm =

the number of analysts following the firm

Analyst_Est._Dispersion_firm = the standard deviation of the analysts’ estimate of the firm’s
earnings
Ln(assets)_partner =

the natural logarithm of total assets of the partner

ROA_partner =

the ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total
assets of the partner

Debt-to-assets_partner =

the ratio of total liabilities to assets of the partner

Market-to-book_partner =

the market-to-book value of the partner

Intangibles_partner =

the ratio of intangibles to total assets of the partner

R&D_partner =

the ratio of R&D to total assets of the partner

R&D dummy_partner =

an indicator variable that equals one if R&D is not reported
by the partner and zero otherwise.

Num_of_bus_seg_partner =

the number of business segments of the partner

Stock_volatility_partner =

the 12-month standard deviation of the stock returns using
monthly return data on the partner from CRSP

Social_capital_partner =

the social capital of the county where the partner is
headquartered in

Alliances_exp_partner =

an indicator variable if the partner has prior experience in
alliance formation
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Alliance_exp_together =

an indicators variable that takes the value of one if the two
firms in the alliance have formed an alliance in the past

Number_of_analyst_partner =

the number of analysts following the partner

Analyst_Est._Dispersion_partner = the standard deviation of the analysts’ estimate of the
partner’s earnings
Alliance type indicators =

eight variables that indicate the type of alliance

Industry indicators =

indicator variables constructed based on Fama and French’s
48 industry grouping

Year indicators =

indicator variables based on the year the alliance was
announced

We use an OLS test with standard errors clustered by firm and alliance. 4 The CAR, at
least to some extent, is jointly determined; and therefore, the CAR of the two partners from an
alliance can be correlated—clustering alliances adjusts for this correlation. The key research variable,
Fog_partner, and all of the control variables are lagged by one year. For expositional ease, we suppress
the subscripts. The control variables we use are quite extensive compared to prior studies that
examine the determinants of CAR around an alliance announcement (see for e.g., Chan et al., 1997;
Kale et al., 2002). Because measures of linguistic complexity, such as the fog index, in the words of
Bushee et al. (2017) “commingle two latent components—obfuscation and information—that are
related to information asymmetry in opposite directions”, it is important that we control for the
informational environment of the firm. We do so by controlling for the size, industry, the number of
business segments, the market-to-book value, stock return volatility, the number of analysts and
dispersion in the their estimates. Appendix A describes in detail how we construct the variables and
the sources of the data.
The hypothesis continues to hold when we use alternative clustering. For example, we confirm that the hypothesis is
robust when we cluster based on the firm and year of alliance, or by alliance-type and year.
4
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Our method, which controls for the firm’s and the partner’s characteristics separately,
identifies the different effects of the characteristics on the CAR of the firm. An alternative method is
to construct the average CAR of the two firms in the alliance (either weighing it equally, or weighing
it based on the market values of the firms), and construct control variables in the same way. In
contrast to these alternative methods, the advantage of the method we use is that it does not assign
an ad hoc weighting to the CAR and allows for greater flexibility on how the firm’s and partner’s
characteristics affect the CAR. To put it differently, in our model it is not the weighted firm’s size, or
weighted R&D expenditure, that affects the weighted CAR, rather the CAR of the firm is affected by
the size and R&D expenditure of the firm and the partner separately.
Our method accounts for the fact that an alliance will generate different amounts of wealth
for each firm’s shareholders that will not be equal or proportional to their market value. Consider
Microsoft’s alliance with Ivillage Inc. The CAR for Ivillage is affected more because it is a small
firm, and the announcement of an alliance with Microsoft might bring recognition to the firm and
increase the possibility to partner with other firms—such factors will not affect Microsoft’s CAR as
it is already a large and well-known firm. Weighing it equally would mean that shareholders’ wealth
will be equally affected, and weighing it by market value would mean that Microsoft’s shareholders’
wealth will increase to a greater extent.
Regardless, we verify that the hypothesis continues to hold when we construct one variable
per alliance by weighting the CAR and the other variables in the analysis.
4.2. Measurement of CAR for the firm when a strategic alliance is announced
If the stock market is rational, then the impact of an economic event should be reflected in
the stock prices. If at announcement, a certain type of strategic alliance generates a greater increase
in the price of the stock immediately following the announcement, we can say that the market
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perceives that type of strategic alliance as creating a greater amount of wealth for the firm’s
shareholders.
Because the price of a stock can fluctuate for many reasons, only calculating the changes in
price before and after the announcement is imprecise. The research typically uses event studies to
extract the changes in the stock prices. The first step in an event study is to select the event window.
Because the market often anticipates these events, this anticipation is captured by including the
observations well before the event. However, including too many days before or after the event is
problematic because the stock prices can be affected by confounding events.
The event window we choose is a five-day window (-2, +2). 5As mentioned in Campbell et
al. (1997), this is a popular window (page 151). The next step is to generate the expected returns for
the stock. Following Brown and Warner (1985), we use a market model. The CAR is the difference
between the return observed in the market and the return expected from the market model. The
parameters of the market model are estimated over a 120-day range starting 30 calendar days before
the event. For a discussion of the event study method see MacKinlay (1997).
4.3. Measuring the readability of the partner’s 10-K reports
We use the fog index to measure the readability of the partner’s 10-K report. There are other
measures of readability, but the fog index is the most popular and a number of studies have used it
in recent years (for e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Dougal et al., 2012; Lehavy et al., 2011; Li, 2008). This
index is a linear combination of the average length of the sentences and the occurrence of complex
words (words with lengths larger than or equal to three syllables). The value for the index is derived
from the following formula:

In untabulated tests, we verify that the numerous tests we conduct in our study largely retain their significance when we
use a window of (-1, +1).
5
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Fog Index = 0.4 * (average number of words per sentence + percentage
of words of three or more syllables)
Envisioned by Robert Gunning, a textbook publisher, this index reflects the number of years
of formal education needed to understand the document. The greater the value of the fog index, the
harder it is to understand the prose. As explained by Li (2008), a fog index value of 18 means the
text is unreadable; 14–18 indicates difficult to read; 12–14 indicates ideal readability; 10–12 is
acceptable; while 8–10 means childish prose. In essence, short sentences written in plain English
achieve a better readability score than long sentences written in complicated language.
We recognize that the fog index as a measure of readability is not without problems. The
most compelling criticism is articulated by Loughran and McDonald (2014) who argue the fog index
has measurement errors because “complex words”, one of its key components is misspecified. They
note that some of most common complex words in a financial document are easily understood
simple words for a finance professional. They recommend using the file size as a proxy for the 10-K.
However, recent research shows that the file size also suffers significant measurement errors.
Bonsall et al. (2017) note that “a vast amount of the variation in Form10-K file size overtime is
driven by the inclusion of content unrelated to the underlying text in the10-K (e.g., HTML, XML,
PDFs)” (page 329). An example they present is illustrative. They point out that 99.8% of file size of
Northport Network Systems’ 2011 10-K filing was due to 20 pictures in the GIF format.
Because the fog index continues to be a commonly used measure of readability (e.g., Bozanic et
al., 2017; Dyer et al., 2017; Lo et al., 2017), we use the fog index as our primary measure of
readability because the file size is not clearly a better measure. Regardless, in untabulated results we
re-conduct the tests in this study with the file size as the measure for readability and confirm that the
results continue to hold.6
6

These results are available upon request.
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We also use alternative measures of readability: the Kincaid index and Flesch index, to verify
that our main results are not sensitive to how we measure readability. Our hypothesis continues to
hold.
5.

Data
Our sample consists of 3,162 firm-years and spans 17 years from 1995 to 2012. This sample

comprises data from 1,581 bilateral strategic alliances that occurred among unregulated and
nonfinancial U.S. public firms.
Our sample construction is as follows: We first collect data on strategic alliances from SDC
Platinum. We require that the alliance is announced between January 1, 1995, and December 31,
2012. We do so because the readability data that we use is available only from 1994 onwards. The
sample selection, that we summarize in Panel A of Appendix B, proceeds as follows: We start with
11,056 alliances that occurred between 1995 and 2012. Sequentially, we remove alliances that involve
private firms (7,263), are joint ventures (578), belong to the financial or utility industries (90), have
multiple partners (113), do not have readability data available (1,009), do not have security price data
available (133), or do not have analyst data in IBES (289). We exclude joint ventures because in
contrast to a strategic alliance, a joint venture is an equity partnership that involves the creation of a
separate legal entity with its own board of directors and managers. However, in a strategic alliance,
the partners exert greater control over the day-to-day activities of the alliance. All of the strategic
alliances that we include in our study (i.e., licensing agreements, marketing or distribution
agreements, research and development agreements, technology transfer agreements, and others) are
non-equity partnerships. Because in a joint venture a partner’s influence is limited, if any, it is unclear
to what extent the readability of a partner’s 10-K will affect the CAR around the announcement of a
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joint venture.7 We exclude alliances with multiple partners because such an exclusion allows for
much cleaner tests on how the partner’s characteristics affect the CAR around the announcement.
After this filtering, we are left with 1,581 strategic alliances. Because of the construction of our
model, the 1,581 alliances lead to 3,162 observations. In order to remove the effects of outliers, we
winsorize all of the continuous variables by 0.5% at both tails.
Appendix B presents more information about our sample. Panel B shows that the number of
alliances is high during 1997 to 2000 and low in the last three years of our sample—2010, 2011 and
2012. Panel C shows that marketing, licensing, R&D, and technology alliances are among the most
common types, which is similar to Chan et al. (1997). These alliances represent about 80% of the
alliances. Panel D shows that almost 56% of the firms in the sample formed an alliance only once
during the sample period. Another 20% formed two alliances. The rest formed multiple alliances,
the highest being Microsoft with 122. Panel E presents the summary statistics for the alliance sample
and those in COMPUSTAT. A comparison of the summary statistics shows that our sample has
larger firms and more profitable firms, with greater market-to-book ratiosThe alliances are common
in the following industries: Business services8 (34.89%), Computers (15.02%), Pharmaceuticals
(10.45%), Electronic Equipment (9.02%), and Communications (4.51%). Together, these five
industries are about 74% of the alliances. We provide a detailed breakdown of alliances by industry
in a supplemental online appendix.
The summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1. The statistics show that the
mean CAR is 1.3% and the standard deviation is 10.8%. The mean of Fog_partner is 19.671 and the
standard deviation is 1.453. A fog index of 19.671 indicates that the 10-K reports are quite difficult
to read. The statistics also show that about 16% of the firms do not have R&D expenditures. By
We confirm in untabulated results that even if we were to include them our results continue to hold. Joint ventures are
about 5% of the strategic alliances.
8 This industry includes businesses such as commercial printing, data processing, photofinishing, testing labs, and
information retrieval service.
7
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construction, the statistics for the firm and partner controls are very similar but not identical. They
are not identical because we have winsorized them, they are identical for the non-winsorized data.
6.

Results

6.1. Univariate results
The univariate results are consistent with our hypothesis: if the partner has a less readable
10-K report, the CAR for the firm around the announcement of the strategic alliance is lower.
Figure 3 presents the results graphically. When the fog index of the partner’s 10-K report is less than
the median, the CAR is 1.81%; when it is more than the median, it is 0.84%. A two-tailed t-test
shows that the difference is significant at a p-value of 0.001. To make sure that our univariate results
are not due to how we split the sample, we conduct other univariate tests. We split the sample into
three quintiles rather than the median of Fog_partner. A comparison of the mean CAR for the lowest
and highest quantiles shows that the difference is greater—for the group with Fog_Partner in the
lowest quartile, the average CAR is 2.26%, and for those with a high fog index it is only 0.79%. This
difference is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001. The correlation between CAR
(-2,+2)_firm and Fog_partner is -0.04 and significant with a p-value less than 0.05. The supplemental
online appendix reports the correlations of all the variables we use in our main model.
6.2. Multivariate results
6.2.1 Main result
The results of the multivariate regression are in line with the univariate results. Ceteris
paribus, the greater the fog index of the partner’s 10-K report, the lower the CAR from the
announcement.
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Panel A of Table 2 displays the results. The p-values are based on standard errors that are
clustered by firm and alliance. Column 1 presents the results of the model described in equation 1.
The coefficient for Fog_partner is -0.0036 and is significant at 5%. A movement in the partner’s fog
index from the 25 percentile to the 75 percentile is associated with a decrease in the CAR of -0.0056
(-0.0036*(20.418-18.726)) that is 43% less than the average increase in the CAR from an
announcement (-0.0056/0.013). The results are similar when we remove the control variables for the
partner’s characteristics (Column 2), or when we remove all of the control variables except the year
and industry fixed effects (Column 3).
6.2.2. Main result holds when we use alternative measures of readability
We use three alternative measures of readability and confirm that the significant association
between the readability of the partner’s 10-K and the firm’s CAR is not sensitive to the way we
measure readability. The first alternative measure is the Kincaid index that is calculated as follows:
Kincaid = 0.39 * (total words / total sentences) + 11.8 * (total syllables / total words) – 15.59
A higher number in this index represents poor readability. Our results are similar to those of the fog
index. The second alternative to the fog index is the Flesch index that is calculated as follows:
Flesch index = 206.835 – 1.015 * (total words / total sentences) – 84.6 * (total syllables / total words)
This formula indicates that a bigger number reflects better readability, unlike the fog and the Kincaid
indices. Therefore, a positive coefficient for Flesch_partner is consistent with our hypothesis. This is
indeed what we find. The third alternative measure is the file size as in Loughran and McDonald
(2014). A higher file size indicates poor readability. We find that consistent with our hypothesis, a
larger file size for the partner is associated with lower values for the CAR. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 2.
6.2.3. Main result holds when we use a weighted CAR and base our analysis on one observation per alliance
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The hypothesis continues to hold when we construct one variable for each alliance and
examine the association between a weighted CAR and a weighted fog index of the two firms in the
alliance. Panel C of Table 2 shows the results. The dependent variable is the average CAR around
the announcement of the alliance. The control variables, including the research variable are the
weighted average of the two firms. Because each alliance is only one observation, by design we
cannot cluster the standard errors by alliance. Rather, we use robust standard errors. In column 1,
the variables are weighted averages—weighted by the market value of the firm. In column 2, the two
partners are equally weighted. The coefficient for Fog – value (equally) weighted which is the value
(equally) weighted average of Fog_partner and Fog_firm, is significant at 5% in both the columns.
6.2.4. The main result is robust when we use propensity score matching rather than an OLS
The OLS assumes that the association between the covariates and the dependent variable is
linear. If the association between the CAR and Fog_Partner is not linear, then our model arguably is
misspecified. To be sure that our results hold, we also use propensity score matching to test our
hypothesis. A matching technique such as this one does not assume any sort of relation between the
dependent variable and the covariates and is better designed to make sure that the relation is not
spurious (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
The main result is robust when we use the propensity score matching. Panel D of Table 2
contains the results. The steps for conducting the matching are as follows: We first divide the
sample into two groups based on the median level of Fog_partner. The observations where the
partner has a higher fog index are considered the treated group and those with a lower fog index the
control group. For each of the observations in the treated and control groups, we calculate the
propensity score—the probability of belonging to the group with high Fog_partner. We use the
following control variables and a logit model in constructing the propensity score: Ln(assets)_firm,
ROA_firm, Debt-to-Assets_firm, Market-to-Book_firm, Intangibles_firm, R&D_firm, R&D Dummy_firm,
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Number_of_bus_seg_firm, Stock_volatility_firm, Social_capital_firm, Alliance_exp_firm, Number_of_analyst,
Analyst_Est._Dispersion , Industry indicators, and Year indicators. We use all possible firm-level control
variables from our regression (summarized in equation 1) in constructing a match. Then for each
observation from the treated group, we find the nearest neighbor from the control group and
construct a matched group. We choose those with the smallest difference in their propensity score in
terms of the absolute value and match them with a replacement. In a graph we do not present in the
paper for brevity we examine whether the propensity scores of the two groups are similar—we find
they are—thus the match is good. We then conduct a two-tailed t-test between the treated sample
and the matched sample.
The results of the analysis show that the mean of CAR (-2,+2)_firm is 0.005 for the treated
group and three and half times higher, 0.019, for the matched group. The difference is significant at
a p-value of less than 0.001. The matched sample is similar to the treated sample in terms of the
other variables—there is no statistically significant difference between the means of the variables we
match. We report these results in Panel D of Table 2.
6.3. Difference-in-difference estimation using the plain English language rule of 1998
In October of 1998, the SEC implemented its Plain English Initiative (PEI). The PEI
improved the readability of 10-Ks; this makes it possible to conduct a difference-in-difference
analysis. The key idea behind our analysis is that PEI’s effect on 10-K readability was particularly
strong for firms that had less readable 10-Ks before the act, and weaker for firms that already had
more readable 10-Ks before the act.
If readability of a partner’s 10-K indeed has an effect on investors’ reaction, as we argue,
then this notion implies that before the PEI, the investors’ reaction to the announcement of an
alliance with a firm with a less readable 10-K will be significantly lower compared to an alliance with
a firm with a more readable 10-K. More importantly, this difference will narrow considerably after
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PEI, presumably because the readability of firm with poor readability will improve dramatically after
PEI.
We design a test for this concept. Thus, we use only two years of data: 1997, the year before,
and 1999 the year after the PEI.9 We note here that in an ideal situation we would want to track the
same two firms that form an alliance before and after PEI. However, it is very unlikely that the same
two firms form one a year before and another the year after the PEI. Therefore, we cannot conduct
such tests. In our set up, a firm forms an alliance with different firms in 1997 and in 1999. In other
words, we keep one of the partners in the alliance the same for both years.
We follow the steps discussed in Hwang and Kim (2017). As in their study, we divide the
firms into quartiles (4 groups) based on the readability of their 10-Ks in 1997. We consider the
group with the least readable annual report the treatment group. Next, for each observation in the
treatment group, we find a match from the most readable group. We do a Mahalanobis-metric
match. We match based on all the firm-level characteristics we control for in our main model:
ROA_firm, Debt-to-Assets_firm, Market-to-Book_firm, Intangibles_firm, R&D_firm, R&D Dummy_firm,
Number_of_bus_segment_firm,

Stock_volatility_firm,

Social_capital_firm,

Allianc_exp_firm,

Number_of_analyst_firm, Analyst_Est._Dispersion _firm. We consider this group the control group.
For each treatment and control group observation, we compare the annual reports of 1997
and 1999. As expected we find that the readability of the treatment group improved dramatically
between 1997 and 1999. This was not the case for the control group.
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Next, we estimate the

following regression.

9

The effect of PEI is likely to be stronger immediately after PEI and might wane in later years.
The average fog index of the treatment group is 21.30 for 1997 and 20.01 for 1999. The
difference was significant at five percent. The average fog index for the control group is 17.83 for
1997 and 18.10 for 1999, and the difference was not significant.
10
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CAR (-2,+2)_firm= β0 + β1TreatGroup* Year 1999 + TreatGroup+ Year 1999 +X + e
Where,
TreatGroup = one if the partner that belongs to the group in the lowest quartile of readability in
1997, and zero otherwise . By construction, those coded as zero belong to the
control group that has readability in the highest quartile (in 1997.
Year1999 =

one if the alliance took place in 1999, and zero otherwise. By construction, the zero
is for firms that formed an alliance in 1997.

X=

the set of control variables we use in our main model.
The results are reported in Panel E of Table 2. The coefficient for TreatGroup is negative and

TreatGroup* Year 1999 is positive. They are both significant at five percent. This significance
indicates that in the pre-PEI period (1997), partnering with a firm that belongs in TreatGroup results
in a significantly lower abnormal stock return, but this difference narrows significantly in the postPEI period (1999). In other words, our difference-in-difference analysis indicates that firms that had
less readable annual reports in 1997 have significantly better written annual reports in 1999. And
presumably because of this change, the difference in the CAR of a firm that formed an alliance with
a firm that had less readable annual report and one that had a more readable annual report has
narrowed significantly.
6.4. The effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K on a firm’s CAR is stronger when the partner’s 10-K is
downloaded to a greater extent
As we discuss in the introduction, there is an increased interest in reading the 10-Ks when an
alliance is announced.11 We ask if the association between the readability of a partner’s 10-K and the
CAR around an alliance’s announcement is stronger in instances where the partner’s 10-K is
As in Drake et al. [2016] we collect data on the number of downloads of 10-Ks from the SEC website. The website we
collect data from is https://www.sec.gov/data/edgar-log-file-data-set.html
11
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downloaded to a greater extent. To do so, we construct an indicator variable, High downloads_partner,
based on the number of downloads of a firm’s 10-K from the SEC website. If the partner’s 10-K is
downloaded more than the median number of alliance on the day after the alliance is announced,
then we code High downloads_partner as one, and zero otherwise. We then interact this variable with
Fog_partner. Next, we introduce High downloads_partner and Fog_partner*High downloads_partner in the
main regression model used to examine the association between CAR (-2,+2)_firm and Fog_partner.
Consistent with the idea that the effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K is stronger when the
partner’s 10-K is downloaded more aggressively, we find that the interaction term Fog_partner*High
downloads_partner is negative and significant at less than 1 percent. They are reported in columns, 1, 2,
and 3 of Panel F of Table 2.
We mitigate the concern that the significance of the interaction term is because we
constructed an indicator variable based on the number of downloads by also interacting two
continuous variables. The interaction term Fog _partner*Downloads_partner is constructed by
multiplying the fog index of the partner and the number of times the partner’s 10-K was
downloaded from the SEC website on the day after the alliance was announced. The results reported
in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Panel F of Table 2, show that Fog _partner*Downloads_partner is negative and
significant.
7.

Additional tests
To gain a better understanding of the relation between the readability of the partner’s 10-K

report and the firm’s CAR after announcing a strategic alliance, we perform additional tests.
7.1. Moderation tests
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We investigate whether the readability might affect the CAR more strongly in certain
situations where the information asymmetry is greater. The idea is that the effect of the investors’
confidence or lack thereof because of the readability will be stronger where there is already, as
investors suspect, greater information asymmetry. The three tests we conduct have results largely
consistent with this idea.
7.1.1. The effect of readability on the CAR is stronger in industries where the firm does less due diligence before
forming an alliance compared to one where due diligence is extensive
We know that due diligence before forming an alliance varies considerably—there is less in
the high-tech industry and more in the pharmaceutical industry (Nevin, 2014). If low credibility is
due to a less readable 10-K, the effect will likely be greater for a firm from a high-tech industry as
investors believe managers are less diligent in pursuing their alliance. In contrast, investors will worry
less about an alliance in the pharmaceutical industry because they presume greater due diligence.
To test this concept, we limit our sample to only those firms that belong to either the
pharmaceutical or the high-tech industry. Like Nevin [2014], by high-tech we mean software and
hardware. In Fama-French’s 48 industry classifications, Computer refers only to the hardware. We
define a firm to be high-tech if it is also classified as belonging to software related industries based
on the four digit SIC.
We run regressions for these two groups separately and test if the coefficient for Fog_partner
differs when using a stacked F-test. We also construct an interaction term for Fog_Partner and Hightech where an indicator variable equals one if the firm belongs to the High-tech industry. We also
conduct a pooled regression.
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For both of these tests, our results indicate that the effect of the readability of the partner’s
10-K on the firm’s CAR is stronger when the firm belongs to the high-tech industry. The results are
reported in Panel A of Table 3.
7.1.2. The effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K report is stronger when the alliance is with a partner from a
different industry
When a firm forms an alliance with a partner in the same industry, the difficulty in
understanding the partner’s 10-K and the ensuing lack of credibility should matter less, because
investors can assume the firm partially compensates for poor readability because it better
understands the environment in which its partner operates. But when the alliance is with a partner
from a different industry, it is difficult to do so. This line of logic suggests that when an alliance is
with a partner from a different industry, the readability of the partner’s 10-K should matter more.
Our results support this logic. We use the Fama-French’s 48 industry classification to split
the sample into alliances that occur between firms in the same industry and those that occur
between different industries. We find that the effect of Fog_partner on CAR (-2,+2)_firm is a lot
stronger when the alliances involve firms from different industries. We report the results in Panel B
of Table 3. The coefficient for Fog_partner is -0.0045 and is significant at 5 % when the alliance is
with a partner from a separate industry (Column 1) and -0.0053 and non-significant when it is within
the same industry (Column 2). We caution the reader that the difference in statistical significance
may simply be due to the sample size. An F-test shows that the difference is statistically significant
with a p-value less than 0.049.
We also conduct a pooled test where we interact Fog_partner and Same Inds.—a variable that
equals one when the two partners are from a different industry and zero otherwise. The coefficient
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sign is positive and not statistically significant (Column 3). As such, we caution readers to interpret
these results as only suggestive and not conclusive.
7.1.3 The effect of the readability of the partner’s 10-K report is stronger for alliances formed before 2002
If the poor readability of the partner’s 10-K adversely affects the CAR because they are
perceived as less credible, then the effect of poor readability should be much stronger before the
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The SOX brought into effect numerous changes to financial
reporting. These changes were made to increase the credibility of 10-K reports. Section 302,
considered one of the most important provisions of SOX, asks key managers to certify financial
statements. This certification means that these managers: (i) have to read the financial statement, (ii)
not be aware of any false or misleading statements (or key omitted discourse), and (iii) that the
management considers it to present an accurate picture of the firm’s financial condition (Louwers et
al., 2013). In the pre-SOX period, the credibility that the management exudes should play a stronger
role.
Our results in Panel C of Table 3 confirm such to be the case. The effect of the partner’s
readability in the pre-SOX period is stronger. To test this, we split the sample into the pre-SOX
period and the post-SOX period. The pre-SOX period consists of the following years: 2000, 2001
and 2002; and the post-SOX consist of observations after 2003, 2004 and 2005. The coefficient for
Fog_Partner in the pre-SOX period is -0.0086 with a p-value of 0.029 (Column 1) and in the postSOX period is nonsignificant (Column 2). The difference is statistically significant at a p-value less
than 0.0321.
We also conduct a pooled test, where we interact Fog _partner and Pre-SOX—a variable that
equals one if the alliance was formed before SOX and zero otherwise. We find that the coefficient
for Fog _partner * Pre-SOX is negative and statistically significant (Column 3) at 5%.
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7.2. The alliance with a partner with less readable 10-K is unlikely to be executed
We argue investors have less confidence in an alliance with partners that have less readable
10-Ks. Therefore, the investors will estimate a reduced NPV for the potential alliance, and hence a
reduced CAR. We argue that there is a behavioral explanation for this phenomenon based on the
prospect theory. But as we point out in the introduction, the explanation need not be exclusively
behavioral, there could be a rational side to the investors’ reaction. Are investors rational in having
less confidence in an alliance with a firm that has a less readable 10-K?
Evidence that this type of partnership indeed has a high chance of failure supports the idea
that investors are also being rational. We recognize it is hard to measure the success of an alliance as
it can depend on the expectations. As such, it is a difficult test to conduct—especially using a large
sample. We pursue the best possible option available to us. The SDC Platinum database has data on
announced strategic alliances that were terminated before being realized. These data provide some
idea on the risk of an alliance failing. We collect these data and construct an indicator variable
Withdrawn that equals one if the deal announced does not occur and zero otherwise. 12 Because the
dependent variable is an indicator variable, we use a logit model to examine the probability of a deal
failing.
In line with our argument, we find that the readability of the partner’s 10-K report is
associated with an increased likelihood of a withdrawal. We report these results in Table 4. To be
consistent, we use the same control variables as we do to examine the CAR (-2,+2)_firm, and cluster
the standard errors by alliance type and firm.13 We find that the coefficient for Fog_Partner is positive
and significant at 1% (Column 1). Based on the results reported in Column 1, a one standard
deviation increase in Fog_Partner is associated with 9 % greater odds of withdrawal (exp
The mean of this variable is 0.28, which means that on average about 28% of the strategic alliances are withdrawn
even before they start.
13 The results hold at a higher significance level if we do not control for firm’s or the partner’s characteristics.
12
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(0.0599*1.453)). Even if we control for CAR (-2,+2)_firm and CAR(-2,+2)_partner, we continue to
find that readability is associated with greater probability that the alliance will be withdrawn before
realization, albeit at a lower significance level (Column 2). 14 Arguably, given that we do not observe
who is initiating the withdrawal, using the average of Fog_Partner and Fog_firm might be much more
appropriate. We find that the results are largely similar (Columns 3, 4). Overall, these results show
that if the market perceives that a partnership with a firm that uses long sentences and complex
words brings less wealth to the firm’s shareholders, they are probably right. 15
8.

Discussion on the main result
In this section, we rule out a couple of alternative explanations for our results. We also

address some of the questions that might arise.
8.1. Opacity due to readability adversely affects strategic alliances but the opacity due to earnings management does not
Our focus is on the readability of the 10-K report. We focus on this aspect rather than
earnings management because the earnings of the partner are not a major factor the firm is looking
at when seeking a strategic alliance. In fact, our analysis shows that the profitability of the partner
does not matter when predicting the CAR of the firm. The coefficient for ROA_partner is
nonsignificant with a p-value of 0.311 (see Table 2, Panel A, Column 1).
Still, an argument can be made that although the profitability of the past year does not
matter, the opacity due to earnings management might make investors wary about the partner’s
credibility, and therefore the partner’s earnings management might affect the CAR. However, we do
not find such to be the case—the opacity due to earnings management does not seem to matter. We
reach this conclusion based on the following analysis: We calculate the discretionary accruals based
We do not control for CAR (-2, +2)_firm or CAR (-2,+2)_partner in these regressions because CAR will control for all
market related factors, including the effect of readability, which is associated with the CAR.
15 In unreported test, we find that the effect of Fog_partner on Withdrawal is stronger when the alliance is between firms
from different industries.
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on the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Klein, 2002).16 Using this variable, we construct
EM_Jones3_partner, which is the average of the absolute value of the discretionary accruals in the past
three years for the partner.17 When we replace Fog _partner with EM_Jones3_partner,
EM_Jones3_partner is not significant—the p-value is 0.119 (Table 5, Panel A, Column 1). Further,
when we include both Fog _partner and EM_Jones3_partner, Fog _partner retains its significance at 5%,
despite Fog _partner and EM_Jones3_partner being positively correlated.
These additional findings that the opacity of the earnings is nonsignificant strengthens our
argument that the opacity due to poor fluency drives our results.
8.2. The omission of corporate governance variables does not drive the results
In our model, we do not control for corporate governance because it halves the sample size.
One could argue the omission of these variables might be driving our main result because the poor
governance might have correlations with how a partner writes its annual report as well as with the
market’s perception of the partner. To make sure that this is not the case, we re-test our hypothesis
by controlling for the percentage of independent directors, and the number of number of directors
for the partner and the firm. In addition, we also control for the aggregate measures of corporate
governance characteristics of the partner and the firm. First, we use the G-index constructed by
Gompers et al. (2003) that uses 28 governance characteristics. The higher the value of this index, the
lower the corporate governance’s quality is. As is common in the research that uses the G-index, we
replace the missing values by using the previous year’s values. We also repeat the same analysis, but
this time use the E-index first constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), who argue that only using the
six key governance provisions in the construction of the G-index is a much better measure. Our

When we use alternative methods to measure earnings management such as performance-adjusted discretionary
accruals as suggested as in Kothari et al. (2005) or Francis et al. (2005) the results remain the same. The earnings
management of the partner does not affect the CAR. For brevity we do not report the results in the paper.
17 The results are the same when we use only the average of the past two years instead of the past three years.
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results remain robust when we control for these corporate governance measures. Panel B of Table 5
reports the results.
8.3. The results are robust when we control for managerial ability
Arguably, the skills of the top management, the CEO in particular, might affect how they
write their 10-Ks. When a firm with an unskilled CEO partners with another firm that has an
unskilled CEO, the stock market’s reaction to the alliance might be subdued. This reaction is partly
because their 10-K is opaque and partly because the market does not have a high opinion of the
managers. Put differently, arguably, the omission of managerial ability might affect out results.
We verify that the results are robust when we control for this possibility. Thus, we control
for the firm’s managerial ability with data from Demerjian et al. (2012).18 In addition, we also control
for the industry adjusted return on assets and CEO fixed effect. We continue to find that when the
readability of the partner’s 10-K is poor, the stock market’s reaction to the firm’s announcement of a
strategic alliance is lower. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 5.
8.4. CAR around announcement of an alliance is associated with and is an indicator of whether the alliance gets
withdrawn before being realized
We argue that when the readability of a partner’s 10-K report is poor, then investors suspect
a high chance of failure and embed such suspicion in the price of the stock. This argument, as we
mention earlier, is consistent with the literature (e.g.,Gulati et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2002).
We test if this concept holds in our data and with our measure of failure. To do so, we test if
an alliance that eventually gets withdrawn before realization tends to have a lower CAR around the
announcement date. If it does, then the lower CAR means that investors can predict, at least to
some extent, the likelihood of an alliance failure. Panels A and B of Table 7 compare the CAR (-

This data is available at http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. We thank the authors for making the data
publicly available.
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2,+2)_alliance equally weighted and CAR (-2,+2)_alliance value weighted respectively. Regardless of
whether we test the equality of means on the medians, for both these measures we find that for an
alliance where Withdrawn equals one, the CAR around the announcement has a lower mean and
median. The results are reported in Table 6.
8.5. Why do firms enter into alliance with firms with less readable annual report?
Our study shows the firm’s CAR around the announcement is lower when the partner has a
less readable annual report. However, why do firms form alliances with partners with less readable
annual reports in the first place? To answer this question succinctly, we note that firms form an
alliance for many reasons. But as long as the expected NPV is positive, it can be optimal to form an
alliance with a firm that has a less readable annual report. Further, the univariate results in Figure 3
show that even when the readability of the partner is in the bottom 33%, the CAR (-2,+2) _firm is
still positive.
8. 6. Does readability of corporate press releases announcing the strategic alliance matter?
Our study raises a related question: Does the readability corporate press releases
announcing the alliance have any effect on the CAR around announcement? Though not required
by law firms often announce their strategic alliance in press releases. Arguably, the first impression
after reading the announcement might affect the view of investors—a less readable announcement
might make the investors pessimistic about the strategic alliance. In contrast, if the investors do not
find sufficient information in the announcement and use the announcement simply as a trigger to
read the 10-Ks, then the readability of the announcement might not have a salient effect on the
CAR.
To examine this question, we collect data on corporate press releases of the strategic
alliances in our sample and calculate their fog index.19 We label this variable Fog_press_release. Because
19

We use the https://readability-score.com/ to calculate the fog indexes of the announcement.
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not all firm’s announcements come out with corporate press releases of the alliance, our sample size
for these tests is smaller. Our sample is reduced by almost 43% to 1,068 alliances from 1,870
alliances.20 Because the announcement applies to both firms, we run a regression that uses the
weighted CARs of both firms.
Regardless of whether we use equally weighted or value weighted, we do not find a
significant association between CAR(-2,+2)_firm and Fog_press_release either in the univariate or
multivariate analyses. For brevity, we do not report the univariate results. Panels A and B of Table 7
show the multivariate results. This is not surprising as investors do not get sufficient information to
assess how much wealth the alliance will bring to shareholders from the announcement because
announcements are short, less readable than the 10-Ks, and often follow a boilerplate template. An
example of a corporate press release regarding the announcement of an alliance is presented in the
supplemental online appendix.
8. 7. Do differences and match between the partners in an alliance matter?
Two more related question arise: Does the absolute value of the difference in the 10-K
readability between the partner and the firm affect investors’ perception? Does the relative size of
the two partners moderate the effect of the partner’s 10-K readability on a firm’s CAR. The answer
to both these questions are negative. When we construct a new variable that takes the absolute value
of the difference in the readability of the 10-K and introduce it in our main model, the variable is
not significant. And, when we construct an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is larger
than its partner and zero otherwise and interact it with Fog _partner, we do not find that the
interaction is significant at 10 percent. For brevity, we do not report these results in the paper.
9.

Additional Robustness Tests of the Main Result

The SDC uses data from articles authored by journalists from the popular press, not just corporate press releases.
Therefore, our sample size when examining the effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K on a firm’s CAR around
announcements are larger.
20
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For brevity, we do not tabulate the results from additional robustness tests. The tables are
instead available in the online appendix. However, we discuss the results in this section.
9.1.

Our main result is valid for recent years and will likely be in the future
Because we do not find that the readability of a partner’s annual report affects the CAR of an

alliance after in the next two years after 2002, this raises concerns on whether readability matters
anymore.
Yet, despite the law, managers find ways to get around the rules (Kane, 1981), and the
investor’s belief in the effectiveness of a certain regulation can wane. The effectiveness of SOX
should wane after some years, and investors will no longer perceive SOX as guaranteeing credibility
to the extent that they do not care about the readability of annual reports.
If our argument is true, then by excluding the years right after SOX and using the later years
in our sample period, we should find that readability still affects the perception of an alliance’s
success. To test this idea, we limit the sample to only the years from 2010 to 2012 and re-test our
hypothesis. We also re-test limiting our sample from 2007 to 2012. In both cases, consistent with
our argument, we find that the readability negatively affects the perception of the alliance’s success
9.2.

The main result is robust when we use the partner’s readability over the last three years, rather than the past
year
There is the possibility that the investors are concerned not only about the readability of the

10-K reports from a year before the strategic alliance but also their readability over the past two or
three years. Thus, we reproduce our main result from Table 2 but this time instead of Fog_partner, we
use Fog_partner (Average of last 3 years). The main results hardly change.
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9.3.

The main result is robust when we use alternative windows for CAR
To make sure that our results are not dependent on our window, we verify that the results

are similar when we use a smaller window of (-1, +1) or a bigger window of (-1, + 14).

10. Conclusion
How a firm writes its annual report affects investors’ perceptions. Recent research shows
that firms that have less readable annual reports trade at a discount and have a higher cost of debt.
In this study, we ask if a firm’s association with another firm that has a less readable annual report
can also affect investors’ perceptions. We use a strategic alliance as a setting to investigate this issue.
We examine if the firm’s CAR around the announcement of a strategic alliance is dependent on the
readability of a partner’s 10-K report. We find that alliances with partners who have poorly written
10-K reports create less optimism—and the CAR is lower. The effect is nontrivial and robust.
Our study contributes to a new stream in the finance literature that argues it pays to write
well (Ertugrul et al., 2017; Hwang and Kim, 2017). Our study shows that not only does it pay to
write well, but it also pays well to form alliances with a firm that writes well.
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Appendix A
Variables
Dependent variable
CAR (-2,+2)_firm
Research variable
Fog _partner

Control variables
Fog _firm

Description
The five-day market adjusted stock returns centered on the announcement
date of the firm. Source: CRSP
The fog index of the partner's annual 10-K report where a higher number
indicates poor readability; this formula calculates the fog index as follows:
0.4 (average number of words+ percentage of complex words). Source:
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/
The fog index of the firm's 10-K report where a higher number indicates
poor readability; this formula calculates the fog index as follows: 0.4
(average number of words+ percentage of complex words). Source:
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/

Ln(assets)_firm

The natural logarithm of total assets (i.e., ln (AT)) of the firm. Source:
COMPUSTAT

ROA_firm

The ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (i.e.,
EBITDA/AT) of the firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

Debt-to-assets_firm

The ratio of total liabilities and total assets (i.e., LT/AT) of the firm.
Source: COMPUSTAT

Market-to-book_firm

The ratio of the market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total
assets (i.e., [PRCC_C*CSHO+LT]/AT) of the firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

Intangibles_firm

The ratio of intangibles divided by total assets (i.e., INTAN/AT) of the
firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

R&D_firm

The ratio of R&D expenditure divided by total assets (i.e., RDX/AT) of the
firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

R&D dummy_firm

Takes the value of one if R&D expenses are not reported by the firm.
Source: COMPUSTAT

Number_of_bus_seg_firm

The number of business segments of the firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

Stock_volatility_firm

The 12-month standard deviation of the stock returns calculated from the
monthly return data for the firm. Source: CRSP
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Social_capital_firm

The social capital of the region the firm is headquartered. Source:
(Rupasingha et al., 2006)

Alliance_exp_firm

An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has formed an alliance in
the past based on our sample. Source: SDC

Number_of_analyst_firm

The number of analysts following the firm. Source: IBES

Analyst_Est._Dispersion_firm

The standard deviation in the analysts’ estimates for the firm. Source: IBES

Ln(assets)_partner

The natural logarithm of total assets (i.e., ln (AT)) of the partner. Source:
COMPUSTAT

ROA_partner

The ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (i.e.,
EBITDA/AT) of the partner. Source: COMPUSTAT

Debt-to-assets_partner

The ratio of total liabilities and total assets (i.e., LT/AT) of the partner.
Source: COMPUSTAT

Market-to-book_partner

The ratio of the market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total
assets (i.e., [PRCC_C*CSHO+LT]/AT) of the partner. Source:
COMPUSTAT.

Intangibles_partner

The ratio of intangibles divided by total assets (i.e., INTAN/AT) of the
partner. Source: COMPUSTAT

R&D_partner

The ratio of R&D expenditure divided by total assets (i.e., RDX/AT) of the
partner. Source: COMPUSTAT

R&D dummy_partner

Equals one if R&D expenses are not reported by the partner. Source:
COMPUSTAT

Number_of_bus_seg_partner

The number of business segments of the partner. Source: COMPUSTAT

Stock_volatility_fpartner

The 12-month standard deviation of the stock returns using monthly return
data of the partner. Source: CRSP

Social_capital_partner

The social capital of the region the partner is headquartered. Source:
(Rupasingha et al., 2006)

Alliance_exp_partner

An indicator variable that equals one if the partner has formed an alliance in
the past based on our sample. Source: SDC

Number_of_analyst_partner

The number of analysts following the partner. Source: IBES

Analyst_Est._Dispersion_partner

The standard deviation in the analysts’ estimates for the partner. Source:
IBES

Alliance_exp_together

An indicator variable that equals one if the two firms had experience in
forming an alliance, based on our sample. Source: SDC
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Other variables used
Withdrawn

A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a deal is announced but is
not completed. Source: SDC

Computer & Software

An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm belongs to the
Computer & Software industry, and takes the value of zero if it belongs to
the pharmaceutical industry. The firms that belong to the Computer (35)
classification in the Fama-French 48 industry classifications or the following
four-digit SICs are classified as belonging to the high-tech industry: 73707372 Services - computer programming and data processing, 7374-7374
Services - computer processing, data prep, 7375-7375 Services information retrieval services, 7376-7376 Services - computer facilities
management service.

High downloads_partner

An indicator variable that is equal to 1 when the firm’s partner’s 10-K are
downloaded more than the median number of downloads one day after the
alliance is announced. Source: SEC

CAR (-2,+2)_alliance value
weighted

The value weighted CAR (-2,+2) for the two firms in the alliance. The value
weights are based on the market value of the firm.

CAR (-2,+2)_alliance equally
weighted

The average of the CAR (-2,+2) for the two firms in the alliance.

CAR(-1,+1)_firm

Two-day market adjusted stock returns centered on the announcement date
of the firm. Source: CRSP

CAR(-1,+14)_firm

Fifteen-day market adjusted stock returns starting one day before the
announcement date and ending 14 days after the announcement. Source:
CRSP

Flesch

Measures reading ease. The formula is Flesch = 206.835 – (1.015 * average
number of words per sentence) – (84.6 * average number of syllables per
word). Source: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/

Kincaid

Measures reading difficulty. The formula is Kincaid = 0.39 * (total words /
total sentences) + 11.8 * (total syllables / total words) – 15.59. Source:
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/

FileSize

The size of the 10-K file. Source: http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/

Fog _partner
(Average of last three years)

The mean of the fog index of the partner's 10-K report for the last three
years (t-1, t-2, and t-3). Source: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/

Fog _firm
(Average of last three years)

The mean of the fog index of the firm’s 10-K report for the last three years
(t-1, t-2, and t-3). Source: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/
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EM_Jones3_partner

This variable is the sum of the absolute value of the discretionary accruals
for the past three years for the partner. The discretionary accruals are
calculated by using the modified (Jones, 1991) model. We calculate the
total accruals (IBC-(OANCF- XIDOC)) by using the cash-flow approach as
suggested by(Hribar and Collins, 2002). Source: COMPUSTAT

G-index_firm

This is the G-index of the firm based on Gompers et al. (2003). Source:
Riskmetrics

E-index_firm

This is the E-index of the firm based on Bebchuk et al. (2009). Source:
Riskmetrics

%_Independent_Director_firms

The percentage of independent directors on the firm’s board. Source:
Riskmetrics

%_Number_of_Directors_firm

The number of directors on the firm’s board. Source: Riskmetrics

Managerial_ability_firm

A measure of managerial ability of the firm’s managers constructed by
Demerjian et al. (2012). Source:
http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html.

Industry_adjusted_ROA_firm

Industry-adjusted return on assets of the firm. Source: COMPUSTAT

G-index_partner

This is the G-index of the partner based on Gompers et al. (2003). Source:
Riskmetrics

E-index_partner

This is the E-index of the partner based on Bebchuk et al. (2009). Source:
Riskmetrics

%_Independent_Director_partner

The percentage of independent directors on the partners’ board. Source:
Riskmetrics

%_Number_of_Directors_partner

The number of directors on the partners’ board. Source: Riskmetrics

Managerial_ability_partner

A measure of managerial ability of the partner’s managers constructed by
(Demerjian et al., 2012). Source:
http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html.

Industry_adjusted_ROA_firm

Industry-adjusted return on assets of the firm. Source: COMPUSTAT
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Appendix B
Panel A
# of alliances

Total number of alliances:
Less (ones that involve private firms):
Less (ones that involve joint venture):
Less ( financial or regulated firms):
Less (multiple partners):
Less ( fog index unavailable):
Less ( CRSP Data unavailable):
Less ( IBES Data unavailable):
Total

11056
7263
578
90
113
1009
133
289
1581

Panel B
Year

Alliances

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

38
89
228
218
213
149
94
80
98
81
94
73
52
28
19
6
16
5
1581
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Panel C
Alliance Type
License_alliance
R&D_alliance
Funding_alliance
Manufacturing_alliance
Marketing_alliance
Supply_alliance
Technology_alliance
Royalty_alliance
Not Specified
Total

% of
Alliances
23.91%
17.33%
0.44%
9.74%
22.26%
1.96%
16.51%
1.71%
6.14%
100.00%

Number
378
274
7
154
352
31
261
27
97
1581

Panel D
Frequency of # of alliances
1
2
3
4
5
6 or greater
Total

% of the sample
55.60%
20.11%
9.71%
5.03%
2.17%
7.37%
100.00%

Panel E

Fog _firm
Ln(Assets)_firm
ROA_firm
Debt-to-Assets_firm
Market-to-Book_firm
Intangibles_firm
R&D_firm
R&D Dummy_firm
Number_of_segments_firm
Stock_volatility_firm
Social_capital_firm

Alliance Sample
Mean
Std. Dev
19.577
1.580
7.079
2.556
0.072
0.225
0.500
0.263
2.350
5.142
0.099
0.151
0.091
0.166
0.246
0.418
2.943634
5.016
0.149
0.112
-0.545
0.793

48

Compustat Firms
Mean
Std. Dev
19.438
1.222
4.769
2.804
0.012
0.280
0.513
0.546
1.022
1.548
0.114
0.178
0.124
0.085
0.482
0.500
3.265
3.551
0.136
0.106
-0.503
0.909

Figure 1: The number of downloads of 10-Ks increases around the time of strategic alliance’s announcement

Notes on Figure 1 This graph represents the number of 10-K downloads five days before and five days after the announcement of an alliance. The yaxis represents the average number of downloads, the x-axis represents the days before and after the alliance, zero is the day of the alliance
announcements. The data are available only after February 14, 2003, and were collected from https://www.sec.gov/data/edgar-log-file-data-set.html.

49

Figure 2
 Investors
have difficulty
understanding
the partner ‘s
10-K
Investors will
consider the
alliance risky

Poor
Readability
of Partner’s
10-K
 Investors
have less trust
in the partner’s
10-K

Investors will
likely be
pessimistic
about the
benefits the
alliance will
bring

 Lower
estimate of
net cash in
the future
 Higher
discount rate

Lower
CAR

 Investors
expect the
alliance’s life
to be short

 Investors
have negative
opinion of
partner’s
manager’s
character

Notes on Figure 2: This figure summarizes how the poor readability of the partner’s 10-K report might be associated with a lower CAR around the
time the firm announces its alliance
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Figure 3
Univariate Analysis: The CAR at the announcement of a strategic alliance is lower when the partner’s 10-K
report is less readable
Panel A

Panel B

Notes on Figure 3: Panel A presents the mean of CAR (-2, +2)_firm for the five-day window around the day
the firm announces a strategic alliance for two subsamples: one where Fog_Partner < median, and one where
Fog_Partner median. Panel B presents the same except that the sample is divided into three equal
subsamples groups where only the highest and lowest quartiles are used. The mean CAR (-2,+2)_firm are for
those in the lowest quartile and the highest quartile.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
N
Mean
Std. Dev
Median
p25
p75
Min
Max
CAR (-2,+2)_firm
3502
0.013
0.108
0.007
-0.034
0.050
-0.687
1.033
Fog _partner
3502
19.671
1.453
19.524
18.726
20.418
8.378
30.791
Fog _firm
3502
19.665
1.594
19.524
18.726
20.417
8.378
30.791
Ln(Assets)_firm
3502
7.028
2.549
7.056
5.049
9.290
0.735
13.590
ROA_firm
3502
0.070
0.243
0.123
0.029
0.189
-0.967
0.431
Debt-to-Assets_firm
3502
0.476
0.266
0.437
0.248
0.611
0.046
0.980
Market-to-Book_firm
3502
2.625
5.567
0.932
0.812
2.416
0.051
7.916
Intangibles_firm
3502
0.103
0.159
0.022
0.007
0.136
0.000
0.765
R&D_firm
3502
0.102
0.185
0.079
0.022
0.142
0.000
0.985
R&D Dummy_firm
3502
0.158
0.398
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
3502
2.828
5.323
1.000
1.000
3.000
1.000
24.000
Number_of_bus_seg_firm
3502
0.144
0.119
0.115
0.081
0.182
0.029
0.722
Stock_volatility_firm
3502
-0.581
0.790
-0.551
-1.177
0.024
-2.219
2.398
Social_capital_firm
3502
0.439
0.496
0
0
1
0
1
Alliance_exp_firm
3502
5.201
9.811
5
2
14
1
51
Number_of_analyst_firm
3502
0.036
0.848
0.0312
0.0127
0.0813
0
1.57
Analyst_Est._Dispersion _firm
Ln(Assets)_partner
3502
6.974
2.254
5.049
9.290
8.024
0.735
13.590
ROA_partner
3502
0.073
0.290
0.123
0.029
0.189
-0.967
0.431
Debt-to-Assets_partner
3502
0.426
0.251
0.436
0.249
0.611
0.046
0.980
Market-to-Book_partner
3502
2.577
5.041
0.922
0.922
0.922
0.051
7.916
Intangibles_partner
3502
0.098
0.133
0.022
0.007
0.136
0.000
0.765
R&D_partner
3502
0.151
0.139
0.079
0.022
0.142
0.000
0.985
R&D Dummy_partner
3502
0.165
0.368
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
3502
2.229
2.640
1.000
1.000
2.000
1.000
24.000
Number_of_bus_seg_partner
3502
0.130
0.085
0.119
0.082
0.181
0.029
0.722
Stock_volatility_partner
3502
-0.502
0.534
-0.455
-1.118
0.023
-2.219
2.398
Social_capital_partner
3502
0.449
0.481
0
0
1
0
1
Alliance_exp_partner
3502
0.027
0.031
0
0
0
0
1
Alliance_exp_together
5.578
9.8735
5
2
14
1
51
Number_of_analyst_partner
3502
0.049
0.8057
0.04
0.01
0.0821
0
1.57
Analyst_Est._Dispersion _partner
3502
Notes on Table 1: This table presents the summary statistics of the sample used in the study. The descriptions of the variables are in Appendix A. All
of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles.
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Table 2: Readability of 10-K report and cumulative abnormal stock returns
Panel A: The main results show that the poor readability of the partner’s 10-K report is associated with
lower cumulative abnormal stock returns
(1)

Fog _partner
Fog _firm
Ln(Assets)_firm
ROA_firm
Debt-to-Assets_firm
Market-to-Book_firm
Intangibles_firm
R&D_firm
R&D Dummy_firm
Number_of_bus_segmens_firm
Stock_volatility_firm
Social_capital_firm
Alliance_exp_firm

Number_of_analyst_firm
Analyst_Est._Dispersion_firm
Ln(Assets)_partner
ROA_partner
Debt-to-Assets_partner
Market-to-Book_partner
Intangibles_partner
R&D_partner
R&D Dummy_partner

(2)
(3)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm

-0.0036
(0.017)**
-0.0019
(0.342)
-0.0085
(0.001)***
-0.0835
(0.005)***
0.0071
(0.239)
-0.0009
(0.014)**
-0.0130
(0.460)
0.0091
(0.672)
-0.0053
(0.476)
0.0005
(0.089)*
-0.0578
(0.052)*
-0.0056
(0.177)
-0.0092
(0.010)**
0.0008
(0.085)*
0.0004
(0.169)
0.0006
(0.456)
-0.0093
(0.311)
-0.0028
(0.526)
-0.0000
(0.298)
-0.0088
(0.455)
-0.0068
(0.674)
-0.0041
53

-0.0035
(0.025)**
-0.0016
(0.399)
-0.0082
(0.002)***
-0.0815
(0.008)***
0.0077
(0.136)
-0.0007
(0.056)*
-0.0089
(0.592)
0.0109
(0.689)
-0.0052
(0.527)
0.0004
(0.140)
-0.0596
(0.040)**
-0.0050
(0.238)
-0.0089
(0.009)***
0.0008
(0.086)*
0.0004
(0.125)

-0.0026
(0.048)**

Number_of_bus_segment_partner
Stock_volatility_partner
Social_capital_partner
Alliance_exp_partner
Alliance_exp_together

Number_of_analyst_partner
Analyst_Est._Dispersion_partner

(0.990)
0.0003
(0.346)
-0.0253
(0.100)
-0.0014
(0.540)
0.0234
(0.015)**
-0.0054
(0.065)*
0.0010
(0.000)***
-0.0001
(0.274)

Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
YES
3162
0.08
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NO
YES
YES
3162
0.07

NO
YES
YES
3162
0.03

Panel B: The main results are robust when using an alternative measure for readability
(1)

Kincaid_partner
Flesch_partner

-0.0033
(0.021)**

(2)

(3)
(4)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm

(5)

(6)

-0.0023
(0.042)**
0.0007
(0.045)**

FileSize_partner

0.0003
(0.072)*
-0.0122
(0.003)***

-0.0051
(0.053)*

Control variables

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
Yes
3162
0.08

No
Yes
Yes
3162
0.01

Yes
Yes
Yes
3162
0.08

No
Yes
Yes
3162
0.01

Yes
Yes
Yes
3162
0.07

No
Yes
Yes
3162
0.01
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Panel C: The association between the readability of the 10-K and CAR is robust when we use equally or
value weighted variables
(1)
(2)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_alliance
Fog – value (equally) weighted
Ln(assets) – value (equally) weighted
ROA – value (equally) weighted
Debt-to-assets – value (equally) weighted
Market-to-book – value (equally) weighted
Intangibles – value (equally) weighted
R&D – value (equally) weighted
R&D dummy– value (equally) weighted
Number_of_bus_seg – value (equally) weighted
Stock_volatility – value (equally) weighted
Social_capital – value (equally) weighted
Alliance_exp – value (equally) weighted
Alliance_exp_together

Number_of_analyst– value (equally) weighted
Analyst_Est._Dispersion – value (equally)
weighted
Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared
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Value Weighted
-0.0032
(0.007)***
-0.0004
(0.416)
-0.0076
(0.035)**
-0.0015
(0.806)
0.0000
(0.038)**
-0.0288
(0.046)**
0.0039
(0.064)*
-0.0166
(0.103)
0.0005
(0.181)
-0.0138
(0.687)
-0.0055
(0.108)
-0.0088
(0.007)***
-0.0039
(0.449)
-0.0007
(0.001)***

Equally Weighted
-0.0033
(0.044)**
-0.0009
(0.302)
-0.0089
(0.227)
-0.0056
(0.339)
0.0000
(0.288)
-0.0137
(0.283)
0.0121
(0.300)
-0.0057
(0.171)
0.0002
(0.516)
-0.0280
(0.213)
-0.0036
(0.066)*
-0.0086
(0.056)*
-0.0045
(0.373)
-0.0008
(0.000)***

0.0005

0.0005

(0.086)*

(0.064)*

Yes
No
Yes
1581
0.04

Yes
No
Yes
1581
0.04

Panel D: The association between the readability of the 10-K and CAR is robust when we use propensity
score matching rather than an OLS

CAR (-2,+2)_firm
ROA_firm
Debt-to-Assets_firm
Market-to-Book_firm
Intangibles_firm
R&D_firm
R&D Dummy_firm
Number_of_bus_segment_firm
Stock_volatility_firm
Social_capital_firm
Allianc_exp_firm

Number_of_analyst_firm
Analyst_Est._Dispersion_firm

Low Partner Readability
(Treated Group)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev

High Partner Readability
(Matched Group)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev

0.005
0.091
0.434
3.138
0.080
0.100
0.135
4.550
0.168
-0.617
0.594
17.098
0.083

0.019
0.080
0.445
3.087
0.091
0.107
0.142
4.713
0.178
-0.634
0.591
16.920
0.236

0.001
0.135
0.416
0.949
0.022
0.077
0.000
3.000
0.131
-0.650
1.000
15.000
0.030

0.131
0.198
0.229
6.528
0.121
0.117
0.342
5.440
0.118
0.788
0.491
12.633
0.180
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0.007
0.123
0.418
0.949
0.022
0.086
0.000
3.000
0.147
-0.732
1.000
14.000
0.030

0.122
0.208
0.254
6.607
0.143
0.119
0.349
5.447
0.126
0.748
0.492
12.331
4.219

Tstatistics

pvalue

3.436
1.369
1.120
0.195
0.788
1.006
0.473
0.756
0.209
0.550
0.121
0.360
1.292

0.000
0.171
0.263
0.845
0.425
0.308
0.637
0.450
0.745
0.582
0.904
0.719
0.197

Panel E: Difference-in-difference estimation using the plain English Initiative (PEI) of 1998
(1)
(2)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
1997 & 1999
1997 & 1999

TreatGroup
TreatGroup* Year 1999
Year 1999
Control variables
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

-0.0116
(0.034)**
0.0204
(0.046)**
-0.0260
(0.024)**

-0.0252
(0.000)***
0.0201
(0.006)***
-0.0362
(0.001)***

YES
YES
YES
220
0.08

No
No
No
220
0.01
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Panel F: The effect of the readability of a partner’s 10-K on a firm’s CAR is stronger when the partner’s 10-K is downloaded to a greater
extent

Fog _partner
High downloads_partner

Fog _partner*High downloads_partner

(1)

(2)

-0.0047
(0.043)**
0.2612
(0.000)***
-0.0103
(0.000)***

-0.0045
(0.046)**
0.2440
(0.003)***
-0.0105
(0.002)***

(3)
(4)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
-0.002
(0.032)**
0.1768
(0.002)***
-0.0097
(0.001)***

Downloads_partner

Fog _partner*Downloads_partner
Control variables
Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
886
0.076

Firm Only
No
Yes
Yes
886
0.063
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No
No
Yes
Yes
886
0.024

(5)

(6)

-0.0027
(0.049)**

-0.0040
(0.043)**

-0.0028
(0.042)**

0.0008
(0.074)*
-0.0001
(0.014)**

0.0010
(0.094)*
-0.0001
(0.048)**

0.0014
(0.013)**
-0.0001
(0.011)**

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
886
0.073

Firm Only
No
Yes
Yes
886
0.061

No
No
Yes
Yes
886
0.023

Notes on Table 2: Panel A presents the main results. It shows that the higher the fog index of the
partner’s annual 10-K report, the lower the abnormal stock returns are when the firm announces its
strategic alliance. A higher fog index means a more unreadable 10-K report. The coefficients are
from an OLS analysis. The p-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm
and alliance ID. Panel B shows that results in Panel A are robust when using alternative measures of
readability (Kincaid, Flesch and FileSize). Higher values of Kincaid and File Size represent poor
readability. Higher values of Flesch means better readability. Panel C reports results where we use
value and equally weighted variables to construct one measure for each alliance. In column 1 the
results are from an OLS where all variables are value weighted. In column 2 we present the results
when all variables are equally weighted. The p-values are based on robust standard errors. The
control variables are as specified in equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of Panel A in
Table 2). Panel D presents the results of propensity score matching with replacements. The treated
group is the group where Fog_partner is less than the median. The matched group is constructed
using propensity score matching. Panel E presents of the difference-in-difference analysis. The
TreatGroup is an indicator variable that equals one if it belongs to the group that has poor readability
in 1997, and zero if it belongs to the control group—the matched set of firms that are similar in
other respects except that they belong to the group with higher readability. The control variables are
as specified in equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of Panel A in Table 2). Panel F shows
that the effect of Fog_partner on CAR (-2,+2)_firm is much stronger when the partner’s 10-K is
downloaded more. High downloads_partner takes a value of one when the 10-K of the firm’s
partner is downloaded more than the median number of times on the day after the alliance is
announced, and zero otherwise. Downloads_partner is the number of times the partner’s 10-K was
downloaded the day after the alliance is announced. Firm Only means we control for the firm-level
characteristics of the firm, but not the partner’s. The sample size is smaller because the 10-K
download data is only available from February 14, 2003, onwards. The t-stats and the p-values test
whether the means for the two groups are equal. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at
the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles. The ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels
respectively. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by alliance and firm and are in
parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.
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Table 3: Moderation tests
Panel A: The effect of the readability of the partner’s annual 10-K report on firms in the high-tech industry
compared to those in the pharmaceutical industry.
(1)
Pharma

Fog _partner

(2)
(3)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)
Computer
Pharma+ Computer

0.0062
(0.373)

-0.0045
(0.032)**

-0.0050
(0.047)**
-0.0136
(0.047)**
0.3095
(0.030)**

-0.0084
(0.159)

-0.0027
(0.225)

-0.0032
(0.174)

YES

YES

YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

330
0.37

474
0.08

804
0.10

Fog _partner * Computer & Software
Computer
Fog _firm

Control variables
P-value for F-test
(Coeff of Fog_partner for Pharma.
= Coeff of Fog_Partner for Computer.)
Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

0.0323
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Panel B: The effect of the readability of the partner’s annual 10-K on the alliances that occur between firms
from different industries.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
Diff Inds.
Same Inds.
All Firms
-0.0045
-0.0053
-0.0047
(0.014)**
(0.306)
(0.016)**
0.0033
(0.431)
-0.0694
(0.407)
0.0024
-0.0039
-0.0024
(0.179)
(0.428)
(0.166)

Fog _partner
Fog _partner * Horizontal
Horizontal
Fog _firm

Control variables

YES

P-value for F-test
(Coeff of Fog_partner for Diff Inds.
= Coeff of Fog_Partner for Same Inds.)

0.049

Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
2738
0.09
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YES

YES

YES
YES
424
0.14

YES
YES
3162
0.08

Panel C: The effect of the readability of the partner’s annual 10-K report on alliances in the pre-SarbanesOxley period
(1)

Fog _partner
Fog _partner * Year 2002
Year 2002
Fog _firm

Control variables
P-value for F-test
(Coeff of Fog_partner for Pre-SOX.
= Coeff of Fog_Partner for Post-SOX.)

(2)
(3)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
Pre-SOX
Post-SOX
Pre-SOX + Post-SOX
2000-2002
2003-2005
2000-2005
-0.0086
0.0001
-0.0062
(0.029)**
(0.954)
(0.007)***
0.0093
(0.039)**
-0.1337
(0.100)*
-0.0012
-0.0055
-0.0023
(0.640)
(0.202)
(0.178)
YES

YES

YES

0.0321

YES
YES
YES
Industry Dummies
YES
YES
YES
Year Dummies
646
544
Observations
1190
0.17
0.09
0.12
R-squared
Notes on Table 3: This table shows that the effect of Fog _partner is stronger when investors consider the
information asymmetry to be higher in the alliance. Panel A shows that when a firm from the computer
industry forms an alliance, the effect of Fog_partner is much stronger, compared to an alliance formed by a
firm in the pharmaceutical industry. Panel B shows that when the alliance is between firms from two different
industries the effect of Fog_Partner is stronger. Whether the alliance is in the same industry or between
different industries is determined based on the Fama-French 48 digit industry classification. The coefficients
are from an OLS analysis. Panel C shows that the effect of Fog_Partner is stronger in the pre-SOX period. The
control variables are as specified in equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of Panel A in Table 2). All
of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles. The variables are defined in the
appendix. The ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively. The p-values are
based on standard errors and are in parentheses.
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Table 4: The readability of the partner’s annual 10-K report increases the probability of an
announced deal being withdrawn before realization
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0805
(0.028)**

0.0871
(0.030)**
-0.0296
(0.938)

YES

YES

Dependent variable= Withdrawn
Fog _partner

0.0599

0.0582

(0.008)***

(0.064)*

Average Fog
(of firm and partner)

-0.0644

CAR (-2,+2)_firm

(0.881)

Control variables

YES

YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
Industry Dummies
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year Dummies
3162
3162
3162
3162
Observations
0.16
0.15
0.12
0.12
Pseudo R-squared
Notes on Table 4: This table reports the results of a logit analysis. It shows that the probability of an
announced strategic alliance getting withdrawn before realization is higher when the value of Fog_partner is
larger. The control variables are as specified in equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of Panel A in
Table 2). All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles. The ***, **, and *
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively. The p-values are based on standard errors
clustered by alliance and firm and are in parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.
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Table 5: Ruling out alternative explanations
Panel A: Partner’s opacity due to earnings management does not affect the cumulative abnormal returns
around the strategic alliance’s announcement
(1)

(2)

Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2_firm

0.0201
(0.144)

-0.0018
(0.040)**
0.0139
(0.624)

Control variables

YES

YES

Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
YES
3078
0.06

YES
YES
YES
3078
0.06

Fog _partner
EM_Jones3_partner

Panel B: Main results are not driven by omission of corporate governance variables
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
Fog _partner
G-index_partner
G-index_firm

-0.0062
(0.041)**
-0.0002
(0.859)
-0.0000
(0.978)

-0.0047
(0.003)***
-0.0009
(0.525)

%_Independent_Director_firm
Number_of_Directors_firm

Control variables

-0.0002
(0.927)

NO

0.0173
(0.388)
0.0016
(0.192)
0.0467
(0.056)*
0.0005
(0.639)

0.0169
(0.100)*
0.0003
(0.750)

YES

NO

YES

E-index_firm

Number_of_Directors_partner

-0.0030
(0.057)*

-0.0016
(0.504)
-0.0009
(0.758)
0.0188
(0.275)
0.0007
(0.513)
0.0252
(0.229)
0.0003
(0.825)

E-index_partner

%_Independent_Director_partner

-0.0035
(0.039)**
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0.0095
(0.505)
0.0006
(0.428)

Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
YES
1396
0.05

NO
YES
YES
1396
0.01

YES
YES
YES
1396
0.05

NO
YES
YES
1396
0.01

Panel C: Main results are robust when we control for managerial ability

(1)
(2)
Dependent variable= CAR (-2,+2)_firm
-0.0050
-0.0034
(0.007)***
(0.015)**
0.0569
0.0043
(0.487)
(0.667)
0.0707
0.0073
(0.342)
(0.796)
-0.0736
-0.1379
(0.001)***
(0.000)***
-0.0020
-0.0028
(0.817)
(0.713)

Fog _partner
Managerial_ability_partner
Managerial_ability_firm
Industry_adjusted_ROA_firm
Industry_adjusted_ROA_partner

Control variables
CEO_partner_fixed_effects
CEO_firm_fixed_effects
Alliance Type Dummies
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
2812
0.12

YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
2812
0.06

Notes on Table 5: The control variables are as specified in equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of
Panel A in Table 2). All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles. The
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively. The p-values are based on
standard errors clustered by alliance and firm and are in parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix
A.
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Table 6: The CAR around the announcement of an alliance is lower for alliances that are withdrawn
before realization
Panel A: Equally weighted
Withdrawn
CAR (-2,+2)_alliance equally weighted (mean)
CAR (-2,+2)_alliance equally weighted (median)
Standard Error
Observations

No
0.0173
0.008
0.004
1135

Yes
0.008
0.002
0.002
446

Difference
0.009
0.006
0.003

P- Value
0.002
0.059

Panel B: Value weighted
Withdrawn
No
Yes
Difference
P- Value
CAR (-2,+2)_alliance value weighted (mean)
0.024
0.010
0.014
0.003
CAR (-2,+2)_alliance value weighted (median)
0.013
0.002
0.011
0.048
Standard Error
0.004
0.002
0.005
Observations
1135
446
Notes on Table 6: This table shows that the CAR is smaller for alliances that eventually fail to be realized.
CAR (-2,+2)_ alliance equally weighted mean(median) is the average (median) of the CAR for the two firms in the
alliance when the alliance is announced. CAR (-2,+2)_ alliance value weighted mean(median) is the value weighted
(median) CAR for the two firms in the alliance when the alliance is announced. Value weights are based on
the market value of the firm. Withdrawn is equal to Yes for those alliances that are withdrawn before the
work on the alliance starts, and No is otherwise. The p-values for the average are based on a two-tailed t-test,
the p-values for the tests of the medians are based on the Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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Table 7: Readability of the corporate press releases that announce the strategic alliance does not
appear to affect the CAR
Panel A: Equally weighted
(1)

(2)

(3)

DV= CAR (-2,+2)_alliance equally weighted
-0.0021

-0.0015

-0.0013

(0.154)

(0.348)

(0.401)

Control variables

YES

YES

NO

Alliance Type Dummies

YES

NO

NO

Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

NO
Yes

NO
Yes

NO
Yes

903

903

903

0.07

0.05

0.02

(1)

(2)

(3)

Fog _press_release (equally weighted)

Panel B: Value weighted

DV= CAR (-2,+2)_alliance value weighted
-0.0027

-0.0019

-0.0009

(0.118)

(0.244)

(0.537)

Control variables

YES

YES

NO

Alliance Type Dummies

YES

NO

NO

NO
Yes

NO
Yes

Fog _press_release (value weighted)

NO
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
903
903
903
Observations
0.07
0.05
0.02
R-squared
Notes on Table 7: This table examines the association between the readability of the press releases on the
announcement with the CAR. One observation represents one alliance. The results are from an OLS. All
variables are value weighted based on the market capitalization. The control variables are as specified in
equation 1 (i.e., all variables used in Column 1 of Panel A in Table 2). All of the continuous variables are
winsorized at the 0.5 and the 99.5 percentiles. The ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
levels respectively. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by alliance and firm and are in
parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.
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